












Career Crisis?   
The Impacts of Financial Shock on Entry-Level Labour Market: 



















Hitotsubashi University Research Unit 
for Statistical Analysis in Social Sciences 
A 21st-Century COE Program 
 
Institute of Economic Research   
Hitotsubashi University 
Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8603 Japan 
http://hi-stat.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/ Career Crisis? The Impacts of Financial Shock on Entry-Level
Labour Market: Experimental Evidences from Thailand in 1997∗
Tomohiro Machikita
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University




Identifying the conditions of entry-level labour market on employment and wages is diﬃ-
cult because there is non-separability of match qualities from ﬁrm speciﬁc demand shock at
the period of transition from school to work. We utilize Thailand’s ﬁnancial crisis in 1997
as a natural experiment which exogenously shifts labour demand temporally. This model
provides three testable hypotheses: (1) entry-level labour market tightens after crisis; (2)
disadvantage of newly entrants at the period after crisis decreases overtime; (3) senior or
highly educated worker’s job and wages are secured. Convincing evidences from Thailand
Labor Force Survey support our empirical predictions.
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11 Introduction
Does ﬁnancial crisis mean career crisis for newly entrants, youth, less educated groups at the
period after crisis? This paper tries to examine the impacts of crisis on labour market outcomes
utilizing the evidence from Thailand’s ﬁnancial crisis at fall in 1997 as natural experiment which
exogenously shifts only the ﬁrm’s labour demand. This exogenous and temporal macroeconomic
shock is useful to identify the impacts of the matching market conditions on employment, wages,
and career dynamics subsequent to the crisis. This shock is also useful to identify the complexity
of relative importance between the returns to age (or potential labour market experience) and
years of schooling at the period after crisis. To seek for the causal eﬀects of ﬁnancial crisis on ag-
gregate labour market, we exclude not only the possibility of information problem on job search
and recruiting process but also technological changes. This paper removes the possibility of the
causal eﬀects of ﬁnancial crisis on frictional unemployment due to imperfect information of job
and worker location. This paper also excludes the causal eﬀects of ﬁnancial crisis on structural
unemployment due to mis-match between worker skills and ﬁrm technology. Exogenous aspects
of ﬁnancial crisis enable us to concentrate on cyclical unemployment due to voluntary unem-
ployment with worker transition from declining industry to booming industry and involuntary
unemployment like plant closing and demand shortage. Thanks to exogenous shifting the labour
demand, we can show convincing evidences of the contribution of age and years of schooling on
employment outcomes: labour force participation and wages. The beneﬁt of using such kind
of experiment is shown in study of by causal eﬀects of government provided training program
on the duration of participants’ subsequent employment, unemployment spells, and earnings
by Ham and LaLonde (1996) and Heckman et al. (1998). Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) and
Angrist and Krueger (2001) summarize beneﬁts and the shortcomings of natural experiment to
compare the treatment group and the control group using experimental or empirical data.
The empirical bottom line of this paper is based on following works of empirical assessment
of recent ﬁnancial crisis on labour market and each household. One project focuses on economic
and ﬁnancial crisis in Indonesia. Another one project focuses on Argentina. Smith et al. (2002)
studies the eﬀects of Indonesian ﬁnancial crisis on wages and employment using household panel
data, Indonesian Family Life Survey (hereafter IFLS). They ﬁnd that aggregate employment
has remained robust because of industry-to-industry mobility. On the other hand, there was
the dramatic declining of real hourly wages for urban workers, around 40%. Frankenberg et
al. (2003) argues the question of household consumption response to the Indonesian ﬁnancial
2crisis. They show in full detail that households reduced spending on semi-durables while keeping
expenditure of foods using IFLS. Thomas et al. (2004) extends the question of household response
to the crisis to education expenditure of the next generation using IFLS. They examine that
household spending on education declined among the poorest household. They also ﬁnd the clear
evidences of investment irreversibility in education. Educational spending is reduced among poor
households with more young children while there was a tendency to keep education expenditure
in poor households with older children. Finally, McKenzie (2004) examines the eﬀects of the
2002 ﬁnancial crisis on households in Argentina and urban labour market response using panel
data from an urban area survey. He ﬁnds that the crisis was a large aggregate eﬀect, with 63%
suﬀering a real income fall of 20% or more while large job destruction.
Following above literatures about causal eﬀects of ﬁnancial crisis on labour market outcome,
this paper carries this research line one step further by focusing on formation and continuation
of job matching for newly entrants and longer slayers of labour market. Former studies have not
paid much attention to this heterogeneity in aggregate labour market. The reason of doing this
study is that we would like to solve (1) which more fragile between schooling and experience after
macroeconomic shock to the labour market is and (2) a robust evidence of changing the wage-age
proﬁles at the period after crisis. Our ﬁrst question of this paper is examined by estimating the
impacts of crisis on employment, wages, and subsequent career dynamics. Our second question
is also examined by focusing the returns to age. Comparing period before and after crisis, we
ﬁnd that the return to age is decreasing sharply while the return to schooling is stable in the
labour market utilizing the Thailand Labor Force Survey. Then, we ﬁnd that the wage-age
proﬁle was steep in youth and slows down in elder at the period before crisis. On the other
hand, the wage-age proﬁle was gentle in youth and no big change in elder. There is possibility
that the impacts of crisis on labour market can change the wage-age proﬁles and returns to age
dramatically. Our theoretical framework to derive empirical hypotheses is very simple. The
bottom line of our economy and search technology is similar to competitive equilibrium search
model by Lucas and Prescott (1974), Wright (1986), Bull and Jovanovic (1988), Alvarez and
Veracierto (1999), and Rogerson (2005). Based on their theoretical setting, especially we will
directly extend models of Wright (1986) and Bull and Jovanovic (1988) to model unemployed
search and job-to-job mobility with idiosyncratic productivity shock. We use the evidences of
ﬁnancial crisis from Thailand which exogenously and unexpectedly shifts the productivity to
lower level.
3Three testable implications are drawn from this theoretical framework: (1) selection tight-
ens for newly entrants at the period after crisis because of less labour demand due to negative
productivity shock; (2) the gap of employment opportunities and wages between newly entrants
at the period before and after crisis persists; (3) selection and reallocation simultaneously oc-
cur especially for senior workers after crisis because of large job destruction due to negative
productivity shock. To examine the impacts of ﬁnancial shock on the transition from school
to work and subsequent career dynamics, we try to combine search-theoretic framework with
Mincerian wage regressions. We show our empirical implementation brieﬂy. First, we identify
the treatment group and the control group in the face of the crisis using the individual record of
“years of labour market experience” in our dataset at the period after crisis. Treatment group
covers the two types of sample of newly entrants at the period after crisis which is denoted by
T1. This group seems to be harder to get the job opportunities after entering the job search
market due to shock. We also have another treatment group which is denoted by T2 as newly
entrants at the period before crisis with working at the period after crisis. They are also aﬀected
unexpected shock. On the other hand, the control group is newly entrants at the period before
crisis with working at the period before crisis which is denoted by C1. Group with Subscript
1( C1 and T1) is newly entrants at the period before crisis. We can examine the impacts of
ﬁnancial shock on the entry-level job market by comparing the outcome between treatment and
control group. Secondly, we examines whether both of the returns to age (or potential labour
market experience) and years of schooling would change or not at the period after crisis. These
parameters rule the labour market outcome.
From the view point of our empirical implementation using crisis as natural experiment, it
is diﬃcult for newly entrants to get a job opportunity at the period after crisis. This evidence
supports an aspect of selection hypothesis. This is consistent with the statistical ﬁnding of
Behrman et al. (2000). We summarize our empirical results: (1) selection of entry-level job
market hypothesis is supported both of white collar and blue collar subsample; (2) gap of em-
ployment opportunities and wages between treatment (with shock) and control group (without
shock) decreases overtime; (3) selection and reallocation hypothesis of senior worker are not
supported because the returns to career speciﬁc experience also hold at the period after crisis.
And we also do not observe any evidences of job instability for main age, over 33 years of old to
47 years of old at crisis.
4The structure of this paper is following. Next section 2 introduces Thailand ﬁnancial crisis at
summer 1997 as experimental setting. Section 3 simply models our economy and equilibrium to
derive empirical hypotheses. Section 4 presents our data source, descriptive statistics, and key
variables. Section 5 shows empirical methodology. Our empirical results are shown in section 6.
Concluding remarks and alternative explanations are discussed in the ﬁnal section 7.
2 The Experimental Setting
Building the experimental setting is the main contribution of this paper. To begin with, we show
the impacts of ﬁnancial crisis on labour market outcome by using a new empirical methodology.
We develop an econometric methodology that ﬁnancial crisis is as a natural experiment for
workers. This empirical methodology enables us to avoid selectivity bias with random assignment
of treatment and control group. We present a simple model which exogenously shifts only
the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity shock with endogenous labour force participation.
This model provides some testable implications for entry-level job market, subsequent career
dynamics, and job to job mobility. Next, we show the convincing evidences that the returns to
schooling is not changed between period before and after crisis. On the other hand, the returns
to age are changed between period before and after crisis. These evidences also enable us to
focus on the fragility between years of market experience and years of schooling. These are our
innovations.
2.1 Previous Studies on Labour Market under Financial Crisis in Thailand
Financial crisis in Thailand at 1997 changed the labour market outcomes, the labour force
characteristics, and its wage-proﬁles drastically. Financial crisis occurred in early fall, 1997.
Crisis had disturbed in the labour market since early 1998. Crisis aﬀects the unemployment
rate, the level of real wages, retention rate, and recruitment frequency through the large job
destruction. Behrman and Tinakorn (2000) and Behrman et al. (2000) report and summarizes
the labour market situations of those periods. They show the impacts of crisis on youth labour
market and senior one: percentage changes of employment, under-employed, unemployment,
and the level of real average wages during the period before (1995-1996) and the period after
(1998-1999) crisis. Especially, there was large negative shock for youth to become an employed.
Real wages is declined approximately 10% level. This paper formalizes the empirical evidences
from previous literatures to create the treatment and control group.
5Financial crisis started from the ﬁnancial market. Crisis was spilled over from ﬁnancial sector
to manufacturing sector and commodity markets. It was unexpected and exogenous shock for
most incumbent workers and new entrants to the labour market. This paper tries to consider
Thailand’ ﬁnancial crisis as natural experiment. From the statistical point of view, it is useful to
focus on longitudinal evidences for displacement workers. To search for strong identiﬁcation of
the contribution to wages level of schooling, years of labour market experience, sector tenure, and
ﬁrm speciﬁc tenure.1 Because this paper can not follow the longitudinal evidences of individual
at the period before and after crisis, we try to ﬁnd an another approach: seeking the diﬀerence
of employment probability and wages level to identify the treatment group and control group
using exogenous shock. Details are shown in the section of empirical methodology.
2.2 Wages Proﬁles and Returns to Potential Experience
Next, we compare the determinants of wages level at the period before crisis with the wages
level at the period after crisis. Firms, workers, and potential entrants realized demand shortages
and job destruction at the period after crisis. We assume that the distribution of unobserved
individual abilities is not diﬀerent between at the period before and after crisis. Due to the
labour demand shortages at the period after crisis, it is diﬃcult for new entrants to be employed
and it is not easy for current incumbents to do job-to-job mobility. Table 1 reveals clear contrasts
on the contribution of age eﬀects between two periods. In short, the estimates of the coeﬃcient
of age and square of age are declined while keeping the eﬀect of years of schooling at the period
after crisis. These results initiate us into searching for the driving forces behind the two wages
equations. There is a steep rise in intercept at the period after crisis. This can be explained by
the unobserved abilities of youth at the period after crisis would be higher than that of youth
at the period after crisis. Both of the two wages proﬁles have diﬀerent curves. The former one,
the wages proﬁle at the period before crisis draws a wide arc. Financial crisis at 1997 changes
an arc of curve. These evidences are eloquently spoken of the impact of ﬁnancial crisis on the
labour market outcomes.
Insert table 1 here.
1Our identiﬁcation strategy is closely related to the literature of studying displacement worker, see Krueger
and Summers (1988), Gibbons and Katz (1991), Gibbons and Katz (1992), Jacobson et al. (1993), Neal (1995),
Parent (2000), Dustmann and Meghir (2005), and Kriechel (2003).
6Before moving the theoretical modeling and implementing the empirical hypotheses, we shall
have more to say about returns to age. The important point to note is that the curve of returns
to age becomes gentle after crisis. This rule holds in all occupations, white and blue-collar. The
two lines of the returns to age intersect around 20 or 25 years of old. The former one, the line of
the period before crisis keeps steep decreasing after crossing. On the other hand, the latter one,
the line of the period after crisis keeps moderate decreasing. This rule needs to be explained
theoretically. Our hypotheses are induced by these structural changes on wages equation.
2.3 Industrial Heterogeneity in Employment and Wage Changes
Finally, we note the weaknesses of the experimental design. This paper utilizes the evidences
from Thailand ﬁnancial crisis in 1997 to examine the impact of aggregate shock on employment
opportunity and wages. Thanks to the macroeconomic evidence, we simply distinguish between
the treatment group which is aﬀected by aggregate shock and the control group which is not
aﬀected by aggregate shock. Our empirical strategy simply estimates the impact of shock on
labour market in aggregate (average) level. We do not mention about microeconomic heterogene-
ity or treatment group heterogeneity; however, there are large diﬀerentials of impact between
industries at the period after crisis. This is our one weakness. Another weakness is that we
ignore the spillover eﬀect from ﬁnancial sector to another export/import oriented-manufacturing
sector et al to understand aggregate eﬀect of crisis.
3 A Model of Job and Worker Flows with Layoﬀs Shock
Overview is provided as follows. Workers are assumed to be diﬀerentiated by years of potential
labour market experience, their current match quality, and their employer’s idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shock. Employed worker or unemployed can choose two alternatives at every period:
(1) She stays in current employer (or unemployment pool for unemployed); (2) She separates
from current employer and moves to another partner without being unemployed (or ﬁnds an
employer for unemployed). They have an outside option on-the-job search while drawing (sam-
pling) the match speciﬁc match quality. Firm also decides to hire (ﬁlling a vacant) and ﬁre
(matching with another partner while throwing current partner away). Exogenous layoﬀ also
exists. Laid oﬀ workers have to stay in unemployment pool to search another job opportunity.
Using this framework, this paper considers the role of unexpected shock on the labour force par-
ticipation and its subsequent labour market outcome. If negative shock stimulates selection and
7job reallocation for a senior group and ﬁrm-speciﬁc skill is not useful under the new employer
(partner), then the returns to years of labour market experience may be declined at the period
after crisis. The realistic assumption that it is not easy to carry ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital into
new job opportunity is also needed to be tested by worker reallocation data at the period and
after crisis. This paper concentrates on the identiﬁcation of treatment and control group at the
period after crisis without ﬂow data between employers. We assume that ﬁrm oﬀers new wages
contract to worker at the period after crisis. If worker does not satisﬁed with new contract,
worker will throw away a current match and ﬁnd a new match. If ﬁrm does not satisﬁed with
current match quality, ﬁrm will ﬁre the worker and also ﬁnd a new partner.
3.1 Setup
This section shows dynamic framework to understand the impacts of shock on the endogenous
participation of labour force and wages. The bottom line of our model is very simpliﬁed ver-
sion of Lucas-Prescott equilibrium search model. Based on Lucas and Prescott (1974), Wright
(1986) presents its search-theoretic version, Bull and Jovanovic (1988) shows its job match-
ing setup, Alvarez and Veracierto (1999) combines the industry equilibrium model with ﬁrm’s
labour adjustment and job search model for workers, and Rogerson (2005) develop new exten-
sion of Lucas-Prescott with sector speciﬁc human capital model. This paper also utilizes the
one tractable dimension of Lucas-Prescott economy and search technology.
Our model combines Wright (1986) with Bull and Jovanovic (1988) to model job-to-job
mobility with ﬁrm speciﬁc productivity shock. Because of seeking for simplicity, this paper
abstracts the learning process about match speciﬁc quality for worker and ﬁrm.Three important
elements; price ﬂuctuations; job-to-job mobility; and dynamic selection combine together to
produce our model. We model the search, matching, and job reallocation process with symmetric
information.
We have two agents in the labour market to sell and to buy the eﬀective labour productivity;
worker and ﬁrm. Both of labour and ﬁrm are risk neutral and ex-ante homogenous. Time is
discrete and agents are inﬁnitely lived. Worker is also divided into wage employed worker and
non wage employed worker. Firm is also divided into employer and vacant. Firm can hire at
most one worker. All ﬁrm; matched and vacant receive idiosyncratic productivity shock from the
cumulative price distribution F(p) with support [p, p], p ∈ [0,∞) every period. Firm can post its
8idiosyncratic productivity to worker when both of two agents randomly meet. When they meet
at random, worker and ﬁrm draw the match speciﬁc quality from the cumulative distribution
G(q) with support [q, q], q ∈ (0,∞). This is symmetry for worker and ﬁrm. For matched agents,
each payoﬀ falls into their hands after matching. Labour and ﬁrm are ex-post heterogeneous
after matching. Then employed worker decides whether accepting new arrival oﬀer or rejecting
to keep current matches. Unmatched workers and ﬁrm continue to search for partners. We
have no diﬀerence of oﬀer arrival rate between employed and unemployed. Finally, wages w are
jointly determined by ﬁrm’s productivity p and eﬀective labour productivity q. Wages have the
cumulative wage distribution K(w). That is all of our basic structure.
3.2 Equilibrium
To seek for worker’s optimal behavior, Bellman equation is useful. We show recursive formulation
of employed worker and unemployed. The value function for employed worker who has a new
oﬀer w  is shown by following recursive formulation:
V (w ) = max
 
w  + β{(1 − δ)V (w )+δV(b)},w + β{(1 − δ)V (w)+δV(b)}
 
, (1)
where β ∈ [0,1] is parameter of discount factor, δ ∈ [0,1] is exogenous layoﬀ parameter, w
and V (w) are option to stay in current match and its value function respectively. If employed
worker is laid oﬀ with probability δ, then she will be unemployed. She has no chance/or time
to do job-to-job mobility in this case. V (b) is the value function for unemployed worker which
is described by unemployment beneﬁt u and new draw from wage w  from wage distribution K
at the next period: V (b)=b + β
 
V (w ) dK(w )=b + β
  
V (p q ) dF(p )dG(q ).
Equilibrium in this economy is derived from worker’s optimal search strategy. The Bellman





w  + βδV(b)
1 − β(1 − δ)
if q  ≥ q∗
w + β{(1 − δ)V (w)+δV(b)} if q∗ ≥ q ,
where new oﬀer is w  = p q  and current oﬀer is w = pq here. The optimal policy for employed
worker is formulating reservation match quality q∗: accept this new oﬀer q  ≥ q∗, and reject to
keep current match q∗ ≥ q . This reservation solves
p q∗ + βδV(b)
1 − β(1 − δ)
= pq + β{(1 − δ)V (pq)+δV(b)}, (2)
9which can be rearranged as
q∗ = {1 − β(1 − δ)}
p
p q + β(1 − δ){1 − β(1 − δ)}V (pq) − β2δ(1 − δ)V (b) (3)
We can check the ﬁrm’s productivity eﬀect on acceptance and rejection of outside new oﬀer.
If the productivity of new partner p  is quite higher than the productivity of current partner p,
the reservation match quality q∗ is decreasing. Employed worker has incentive to match with
new ﬁrm who has bad match quality for her instead of high productivity. If the productivity of
new partner p  is lower than the productivity of current partner, the result is reverse. Employed
worker has no incentive to match with bad ﬁrm for her. We can derive following result: given
ﬁxed p, reservation match quality q∗ is decreasing function of the new outside productivity p .
3.3 Crisis
Let me apply our main result to crisis eﬀect on job and worker ﬂows here. We deﬁne shock as
idiosyncratic productivity disturbance. Individual ﬁrm has high probability of receiving negative
shock in recession period. We call this situation rainy season. Individual ﬁrm also has high
probability of receiving positive shock in boom period. We also call this situation sunny season.
To keep simpliﬁcation, we assume that sunny and rainy seasons are exogenously determined by
market productivity distribution. It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a high productivity ﬁrm in rainy season.
But it is easy to ﬁnd a high productivity ﬁrm in sunshine season. The productivity ratio between
inside and outside is deﬁned by r ≡ p /p ⇔ 1/r ≡ p/p . Random draw (meeting) of ﬁrm’s
productivity p  and its outcome r will reﬂect whether economy is in sunshine or rainy season.
The sunshine season is deﬁned by the probability of ﬁnding a ﬁrm with higher productivity than
current partner Pr(r>1) > 1
2. The rainy season is also deﬁned by Pr(r<1) > 1
2. We can
derive the following result: reservation match quality q∗ is decreasing function of the relative
productivity r.
This means that a shock rules job and worker reallocation. That is why, if negative shock
suddenly comes to the product market, r will shift toward to lower. As r goes to small (expected
outside option is less attractive), reservation match quality increases. If negative shock makes
new match is more attractive for worker and ﬁrm, they will decide to break current match and
to match with new partner. Job creation and destruction are accelerated by negative shock.
10There is large job reallocation (JR)( =JD + JC) due to negative shock. On the other hand, if
negative shock makes new match is less attractive for worker and ﬁrm and this force dominates,
then there is no job and worker ﬂows. Stable relationship is build by negative shock.
3.4 Wage Determination and Employment Opportunity
Because our empirical hypotheses have some implications on returns to years of potential labour
market experience, we derive wage equation from our theory. We assume that si is years of
schooling, xit is years of worker’s potential experience. The function of years of schooling and
potential experience is shown by f(s,x) with f  > 0 and f   < 0 for individual i at the period t.
Our theory restricts empirical wage determination like Bull and Jovanovic (1988) as follows;
logWijt = logf(si,x it) + logpijt + logqij + logεijt
where logεijt is i.i.d another shock and unobserved ability. The match speciﬁc quality logqij
is time invariant. The idiosyncratic productivity shock logpijt is time variant. We assume
that productivity shock and relation speciﬁc match quality are determined independently. All
the variables except for xit is unobserved for econometricians. Observable characteristics are
gender, years of schooling, years of potential labour market experience, local labour market.
Unobservable variables for econometricians are summarized by uijt(= logpijt+logqij +logεijt).
At the period t, individual will choose to work as wages worker, Eit = 1 if the new wage oﬀer
exceeds the current value of not working as wages worker. This decision rule is determined by
the current value of not working as wages worker logb, new arrival of price p , new arrival of
match quality q , individual years of schooling, years of potential experience, and unobserved
shock and/or ability ε  as follows;
Eit =
 




where latent variable u∗
ijt = logb − logf(si,x it) covers unobserved beneﬁt for unemployed,
working in agricultural sector, and self-employment sector. This is our structure of participation
decision in wages worker.
3.5 Testable Hypotheses and Empirical Predictions
Now we can introduce hypotheses to be examined. To do this, we focus on the returns to
years of labour market experience f (x) and f  (x) in wages equation. The years of potential
11labour market experience will reﬂect ﬁrm or industry speciﬁc human capital for each worker.
If a worker is laid oﬀ during crisis or quit on her current match and moves to another ﬁrm or
industry, her accumulated human capital will be obsolescence. The decline of the returns to
experience in aggregate level is supported by job reallocation eﬀect. If an incumbent is not laid
oﬀ and does not quit during the crisis, it will be diﬃcult to ﬁnd entry into the tight-market
except for a good-luck worker or a high able worker. Selection becomes extremely tight for mass
of new entrants. Only a good-luck and a high able worker can entry and survive during the
crisis. This selection eﬀect pushes the returns to labour market experience down. The decline of
the returns to experience in aggregate level is also supported by selection eﬀect. Testing against
the following hypotheses are purely empirical issues.2
Crisis as unexpected negative shock is an absolutely key assumption to do our empirical
implementation. To use macroeconomic shock as a “natural experiment”, the model provides a
new understanding the relationship between on-the-job search and wages determination at the
period before and after crisis.3 First, if incumbents have a high probability to stay in oﬃce due
to the less occurrence of the job reallocation at the period after crisis, then new entrants into the
market are severely restricted (by small size of search market). This hypothesis H.1 predicts
that the returns to experience are declined at the period after crisis because of tight selection
for new entrants.
Hypothesis 1 Entry-selection; Selection in entry level tightens after crisis. It is diﬃcult for
new entrants to be employed at the period after crisis. Average productivity among newly em-
ployed is higher than newly employed at the period before crisis.
Secondly, if negative shock creates large gap of employment probability between newly en-
trants at the period before and after shock, then it is not easy to ﬁll the gap soon.
2We are able to propose an alternative explanation of the impacts of crisis on labour market adjustment; new
wage contracts are posting. Firm and worker agree the new wage contract at the period after crisis while keeping
current match. New wage contracts are adjusted by negative demand shock. This says that ﬁrm posts new wage
contract and worker accept it against the loss of employment risk. Both of ﬁrm and worker can observe the match
quality at the period before and during the crisis. They also know a fresh contract for the period after crisis at
the period before quit or layoﬀ decision. Econometrician does not have only the proxies of their match quality but
also a fresh contract. Only the new realized wage contract at the period after crisis is observed by econometrician.
3We do not consider the direct eﬀect of negative shock on matching quality. If matching quality is worse at
the period after crisis than the period before crisis, the relationship between ﬁrm and worker will be unstable.
This force expands the size of search market.
12Hypothesis 2 Persistency; The gap of employment probability and wages level persists between
newly entrants at the period before and after shock overtime.
Finally, if incumbents have a low probability to stay in current partner due to job reallocation,
then there is a shuﬄe among ﬁrm’s incumbent workers and new entrant workers due to the large
job reallocation. This hypothesis H.3 predicts that the returns to experience are declined at the
period after crisis because of obsolescence of ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital due to job reallocation.
Hypothesis 3 Reallocation; Job reallocation arises at the period after crisis in aggregate level.
Shock stimulates quits and laid-oﬀs at the period after crisis.
4 The Thailand Labor Force Survey
4.1 Data collection
The data source used in this paper is The Thailand Labor Force Survey (hereafter LFS), 1994-
2000 by National Statistical Oﬃce (NSO) of Thailand. This individual-level data provides the
information on much of the individual characteristics: gender, structure of family, years of
schooling, years of labour market experience, wages (or proﬁt for self-employment household
and proﬁt for agricultural household), labour force status, migration status, hours and days of
weekly work, occupation, industry, region, marital status; and its employer characteristics: ﬁrm
size, industry, and fringe beneﬁts.
LFS occurs the four times per year. The ﬁrst round of survey is done in February, the dry
season in Thailand. The third round is done in August, the monsoon (agricultural) season.
We use only the third round survey because of neglecting seasonal labour migration at the dry
season. The second and third rounds are done in May and November respectively. Because LFS
does not follow the individuals from year to year, this study can not access the information on
the labour mobility from the pre-crisis period to post crisis period. This study also uses pooled
cross-sections as previous studies on aggregate labour market and urban immigration; Yamauchi
(2002)’s study about migrants in the face of crisis at Bangkok, Kimura (2004)’s study on learning
about own ability by youth migrants to Bangkok, Machikita (2004)’s study on identiﬁcation of
learning by migrating eﬀect and self-selectivity for job-seekers (treatment group) and family
migrants (control group) to Bangkok; Machikita (2005) studies the causal relationship between
13job search method and wage dispersion in developing economy using data from Bangkok labour
market to analyze the microfoundation of aggregate matching function.
The sample used in this paper comes from not only “Greater Bangkok Area” and other rural
area: we use whole sample of the Kingdom of Thailand, year 1994 to year 2000. We would like to
mention about geographic characteristics. This paper constructs GBA (Greater Bangkok Area)
dummy variable equals to 1 if each province is included in Bangkok metropolitan area. Almost of
all industry and occupation tend to agglomerate in GBA. This classiﬁcation of regional dummy
reﬂects the geographic distribution of industry and occupation in the face of crisis.
4.2 Deﬁnition and Construction of Key Variables
Let me summarize our data generating process to draw strong power of identiﬁcation. Details
are shown in the section of empirical methodology. This paper constructs one unique variable
on the basis of the information in the LFS, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000. This variable and some
assumptions play important roles to identify the treatment group and control group respectively.
We construct a shock-dummy variable which identiﬁes the treatment (newly entrants at the
period after crisis) and control group (newly entrants at the period before crisis) using the
information of the length of working life after graduating. This paper chooses the variable
“years of potential labour market experience” to examine the impacts of crisis.4 We identify the
treatment group and the control group in the face of the crisis using the individual record of
“years of potential labour market experience”. For treatment group, shock-dummy variable(s)
equals to 1 if the labour force who has less than 1 years of experience at the survey year 1998,
less than 2 years of experience at the survey year 1999, and less than 3 years of experience at
the survey year 2000. This group seems to be harder to get the job opportunities after entering
the market due to unexpected exogenous shock. On the other hand, the control group already
enters the labour market at the period before crisis.
Additionally, we deﬁne that age at shock dummy variables equal to 1 if the individual’s age
at crisis is a. Finally, we also deﬁne that years of schooling at shock dummy variables equal
to 1 if the individual’s years of schooling at crisis is e. We use both of two dummy variables
4The variable “years of labour market experience” is calculated by age minuses years of schooling completion
minuses six years old. A person who is 35 years of old and holds 12 years of schooling (suitable to high school
level)’s years of labour market experience is 17 years.
14to check the parameter changes; returns to age and returns to years of schooling due to the
crisis. Treatment groups are wage employed at the period after crisis and control groups are
wage employed at the period after crisis respectively.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows the aggregate consequences of crisis to the labour market. The variables are
individual characteristics, industry categories, and occupation categories. Individual character-
istics covers age, gender, household size, years of schooling, living in Greater Bangkok Area,
wage employed, log of weekly wage, log of proﬁt for self-employment household, log of proﬁt for
agricultural household, number of working days per week, number not working days per week,
number of family workers in household, and union status. I would like to emphasize four points
in the changes of individual characteristics. First, urban population is decreasing at the period
after crisis: 8.4% to 7.8%. Secondly, log of weekly wage and log of proﬁt for self-employment
household are decreasing at the period after crisis. On the other hand, log of proﬁt for agricul-
tural household is increasing at the period after crisis: 6.08 to 6.14. Thirdly, number of working
days is decreasing from 6.27 days per week to 6.14 days per week at the period after crisis.
Number of not working days is increasing from 0.16 days per week to 0.21 days per week at
the period after crisis. But both of standard deviations of working and not working days are
increasing at the period after crisis. Finally, union status is sharply increasing at the period after
crisis. The percentage that workers belong to ﬁrm with union is increasing from 4.5% to 8.9%
at the period after crisis. The percentage that workers are member of union is also increasing
from 2.7% to 9.6%.
Insert table 2 here.
The features of industry are summarized in table 3. The highlight is decreasing the popula-
tion of construction sector at the period after crisis: 5.5% to 4.1%. Heavy industry demands a
lot of job opportunities at the period after crisis. The features of occupation are also summa-
rized in table 4. The population of craftsman decreased at the period after crisis: 12% to 10%.
The professional, technical, administrative, and managerial workers increased at the period after
crisis. These are an outline of the labour market at the period before and after crisis. These
15tables speak that aggregate employment opportunities seem to be stable between period before
and after crisis. We look more carefully into the entry level through this paper.
Insert table 3 and table 4 here.
We would like to focus attention on the years of schooling and wages level here. We decom-
pose aggregate level into occupation categories: white-collar and blue-collar simply. White-collar
job covers the occupation of professional, technical, administrative, executive, managerial, and
clerical works. Blue-collar job covers the occupation of sales, miners, transport and communica-
tion workers, production, and service workers. Agricultural workers are excluded from blue-collar
workers. Both of table 5 and 6 present means and standard deviations for the our main variables
of our interests; years of schooling and log of weekly wages. Because of showing clear contrast
between the two situations: at the period before and at the period after crisis, our sample of
this summary is restricted by age and working status. Age is restricted from 13 years of old
to 59 years of old. Column 1 represents data for wage employed at the period before crisis.
Column 2 also shows data for wage employed at the period after crisis. The table reports the
data of years of schooling for two types of new entrants. Row 1 shows that there is steep rise of
average years of schooling for wage employed at the period after crisis. This reﬂects the trend
that educational attainment is increasing. Average years of schooling for white-collar worker,
blue-collar worker, GBA worker, and rural area worker are also rising for employed at the period
after crisis. This is observation for wage employed. This table contains the market selection
and trend of educational attainment. The average years of schooling among whole population
and the average years of schooling among wage employed are 7.02 years and 8.63 years at the
period before crisis respectively. The average years of schooling among whole population and
the average years of schooling among wage employed are 7.61 years and 9.27 years at the period
after crisis. The increasing in 0.39 years of schooling is contribution of aggregate trend during
the periods. The market selection requires more 1.61 years at the period before crisis to be wage
employed and more 1.66 years at the period after crisis to be wage employed.
Insert table 5 here.
16Table 6 shows data of the log of weekly wages for wage employed at the period before crisis
and wage employed at the period after crisis. Both of the wages for white collar and blue collar
are decreasing at the period after crisis. But this is not sharply decreasing. The levels of wages
are quite similar between the two periods for GBA workers and rural workers. The rigorous
analysis of wages level will be shown in the section of empirical results.
Insert table 6 here.
5 Empirical Methodology
5.1 Crisis as Natural Experiment
We examine the eﬀect of the crisis on employment for less-experienced worker, especially, for
newly entrants to the labour market. We assume that the crisis is unexpected shock for every
worker and every new graduate. No worker can expect which the occupation, the industry, and
the employment status is going to have a negative shock at the period before crisis. Table 7
shows the dates of entry and the years of potential labour market experiences for individual
worker. The years of potential labour market experience means that age of individual minuses
the years of schooling completion at each survey year. Newly entrants to the labour market
at the period before crisis are brieﬂy summarized in a C1 (control). The diﬀerence between
two types of newly entrants is whether individual is working at the period after crisis or not.
Newly entrants accumulate the labour market experience every year. On the other hand, newly
entrants at the period before crisis with working at the period after crisis are summarized in a
T1 (type1 treatment group). Newly entrants at the period after crisis are also summarized in a
T2 (type 2 treatment group). We can observe that newly entrants at year 1994 have seven years
of experience in the labour market at year 2000 and newly entrants at year 1997 have four years
of experience at year 2000 from Table 7. Unexpected shock comes once at summer and fall in
1997, Thailand. We expect it is more diﬃcult for each T2 entrants to enter the labour market
at the period during and after crisis than newly entrants at the period before crisis who is in C1
or T1.5
5Our empirical strategy is quite similar to Duﬂo (2001)’s Indonesian school construction between 1973-1978
and Crepon and Kramarz (2002)’s the 1982 mandatory reduction of the workweek in France.
17Insert table 7 here.
Our empirical methodology requires following two assumptions to build experimental setting
that is suggested by Angrist et al. (1996); random assignment and exclusion restrictions. Random
assignment means that crisis is unexpected shock to the incumbent workers and newly entrants
in labour market and the treatment assignment T is random. Exclusion restriction means that
every individual has no incentive to delay the timing of entry during the crisis period. Our
strategy is straightforward because the ﬁnancial crisis as experiment was done at random. This
randomization gives us reduced-form approach to estimate the eﬀect of crisis on less-experienced
worker. The reduced form eﬀect of crisis can be shown here by comparing the means of the labour
market outcomes (employment and wages) in newly entrants at the period after crisis and new
entrants at the period before crisis.
We deﬁne the Elit as an employment dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual i is wages
worker at the length of potential labour market experience is l at year t. Dlit as a Shock dummy
variable equal to 1 if the potential labour market experience l at year t is less than 1 year at
year 1998 (that is, D1i1998 = 1), less than 2 years at year 1999 (that is, D2i1999 = 1), and less
than 3 years at year 2000 (that is, D3i2000 = 1). Dlit covers all newly entrants of T-label. This




















li are employment dummy for treatment group (T) who is employed at the
periods after crisis t=1998, 1999, 2000. On the other hand, E
C1
li is employment dummy for
control group (C1) who is employed at the periods before crisis, t=1994, 1995, and 1996.
We can run the following regression to test empirical hypothesis that selection at entry level
tightens after crisis especially for newly entrants at the period after crisis with less than 1 year
of potential labour market experience (that is, the new graduates from each level of school):
E1it = X1itβ1 + D1i1998γ1998 + D1i1999γ1999 + D1i2000γ2000 + v1it, (4)
where the vector of individual characteristics with 1 year of potential labour market experience
is deﬁned by X1it (such as gender, age, years of schooling, and region), and v1it is the mixture of
18unobserved individual characteristics who has 1 year of potential labour market experience. The
coeﬃcient of D1it dummy variable γt captures the impacts of timing of entry on employment
probability for newly entrants at the period after crisis (t = T2) relative to newly entrants at the
period before crisis (t = C1). Control group is expected to have higher employment probability
than treatment group. We expect each γt is signiﬁcantly negative. We summarize testable
hypotheses: selection at entry level tightens after crisis for newly entrants.



































li are an employment dummy variable at
the period before (t = C1) and after (t = T1 and t = T2) crisis respectively. The following wages
regression is also to test our empirical hypothesis that selection tightens after crisis especially
for newly entrants who have 1 year of potential labour market experience:
logW1it = X1itβ1 + D1i1998η1998 + D1i1999η1999 + D1i2000η2000 + u1it, (5)
where the u1it is unobserved characteristics and/or quality of match. The coeﬃcient of D1it
dummy variable ηt captures the impacts of crisis on level of wages for newly entrants at the
period after crisis relative to newly entrants at the period before crisis. The latter group could
enter the market without a negative shock. On the other hand, we expect it is more diﬃcult
to be employed (that is, E
T2
1i = 1) for newly entrants at the period after crisis. Because of this
selection at entry level, we also expect that average productivity and/or quality of match of
newly employed at the period after crisis is higher than newly employed with working at the
period before crisis. We present the testable hypothesis: average productivity and/or quality of
match is higher for the newly entrants at the period after crisis. The level of each ηt captures
this.
That is all of our empirical methodology to test the hypothesis that selection at entry level
tightens in the labour market for newly entrants at the period after crisis. If selection matters,
average productivity and quality of match is higher for newly employed at the period after crisis
than newly employed at the period after crisis.
195.2 Good timing, Bad timing, and its Persistency
When do disadvantages in entry at bad time disappear? We check the dynamic impacts of
crisis on employment probability and level of wages. Our empirical methodologies apply to
this question. First, we already have the coeﬃcient of D1it dummy variable γt captures the
impacts of timing of entry on employment probability for newly entrants at the period after
crisis (t = T2) relative to newly entrants at the period before crisis (t = C1). Secondly, we need
to get the coeﬃcient of D2it and D3it dummy variables respectively. Finally, we can compare
the level of coeﬃcients to examine persistency of the diﬀerence between entrants at the period
before and after crisis. Our theory predicts this diﬀerence will not persist overtime as long as
shock is temporary.
We can run the following regression to test empirical hypothesis that diﬀerence of labour
market outcome E2it persists overtime:
E2it = X2itβ2 + D2i1998θ1998 + D2i1999θ1999 + D2i2000θ2000 + v2it, (6)
and
E3it = X3itβ3 + B3i1998π1998 + B3i1999π1999 + D3i2000π2000 + v3it, (7)
where D2i1998 is equal to 1 if the potential labour market experience l is 2 years at year 1998.
D2i1998 = 1 sample is newly entrants at the period before crisis but they are aﬀected from shock.
D3i1998 and D3i1998 are equal to 1 if the potential labour market experience l is 3 years at year
1998 or 1999. D3i1998 = 1 sample and D3i1999 are also newly entrants at the period before crisis
but they are aﬀected from shock. The vector of individual characteristics with 2 years or 3 years
of potential labour market experience is deﬁned by X2it or X3it respectively. The term v2it or
v3it are the mixture of unobserved individual characteristics and/or quality of match who has 2
years or 3 years of potential labour market experiences. The coeﬃcient of D2it dummy variable
θt captures the impacts of timing of entry on employment probability for newly entrants with
the 2 years at the period after crisis (t = T1 and T2) relative to newly entrants with the 2 years
at the period before crisis (t = C1). The coeﬃcient of D3it dummy variable πt also captures the
impacts of timing of entry on employment probability for newly entrants with the 3 years at
the period after crisis (t = T) relative to newly entrants with the 3 years at the period before
crisis (t = T1 and T2). Control group keeps expected to have higher employment probability
than treatment group. We expect that γ1998 <θ 1999 <π 2000 as long as the impact of crisis
20is negatively highest at year 1998 and shock is temporary. We follow same cohort who entries
the labour market at year 1998. If shock occurs temporary and disappears soon, individual are
able to be wage employed. We also expect that γ1999 <θ 2000. We also follow same cohort who
entries the labour market at year 1999. The empirical results are shown in the next section.
This way holds for examining the time-variant diﬀerence of treatment and control group.
We can run the following regression to test empirical hypothesis that diﬀerence of productivity
and/or quality of match persists overtime:
logW2it = X2itβ2 + D2i1998ρ1998 + D2i1999ρ1999 + D2i2000ρ2000 + u2it. (8)
and
logW3it = X3itβ3 + D3i1998ξ1998 + D3i1999ξ1999 + D3i2000ξ2000 + u3it. (9)
where the u2it or u3it are unobserved characteristics and/or quality of match with 2 years or 3
years of potential labour market experience. We also expect η1998 >ρ 1999 >ξ 2000 as long as
tight selection at entry level in year 1998 and shock is temporary. If shock occurred temporary,
every individual can enter the labour market when shock disappears. Average productivity is
decreasing overtime. We also expect that η1999 >ρ 2000. We also follow same cohort who entries
the labour market at year 1999.
5.3 Returns to Age: Before and After Crisis
Finally, we shall now look into another aspect of crisis; impacts on senior workers. Our theory
also predicts that reservation quality of match is higher for senior than junior worker. Because
senior worker is also hard to ﬁnd an outside option with high price during the crisis, senior
workers stay in current matches. The testable hypothesis is that junior’s jobs are not more
stable than senior’s jobs even in the period of crisis.
Our empirical strategy is also straightforward because we know individual ages at shock.
Every worker can not adjust her age at shock in 1997. This randomization gives us reduced-
form approach to estimate the eﬀect of age at crisis on labour market outcome. The reduced
form eﬀect of age at crisis can be shown here by comparing the means of the outcomes in workers
who have nine age categories at the period before and after crisis. That is why, the key point
of the data collection is to identify a treatment group as age a at the period after crisis and a
21control group as age a at the period after crisis. We deﬁne Aait as a dummy variable equals to
1 if the individual i’s age at year t is included in age categories a. We also use Dit as a dummy
variable equals to 1 if individual i is recorded in the data at the period after crisis. We make
interaction variable of “age at crisis” Aait ∗ Dit now. Eit as an employment dummy variable
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We can also run the following regression to test empirical hypothesis that reallocation occurs
especially for senior worker at the period after crisis:
Eit = Xitβ +
 
a
(Aait ∗ Dit)φa + vit, (10)
where vit as the composite of unobserved individual productivity and/or quality of job match.
The coeﬃcient φa captures the impacts of individual’s age at crisis on employment probability
relative to same age individual at the period before crisis. Because of negative shock on the
labour market, we expect that φa < 0 and ∂φa/∂a > 0. The former φa < 0 means that it is
diﬃcult to be employed at the period after crisis for individual who has age a relative to the
period before crisis for individual who has age a. The latter means that the negative impacts of
age at shock are decreasing with age.
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i at year 1994, 1995, 1996 as control group.
The following wages regression is also to test our empirical hypothesis that wage premium of
age at shock is positive due to tight selection into the labour market:
logWit = Xitβ +
 
a
(Aait ∗ Dit)ψa + uit, (11)
where the coeﬃcient ψ captures the impacts of age at shock on wages for treatment group as
employment at the period after crisis relative to control group as employment at the period before
crisis. We expect ψa is signiﬁcantly positive and it is higher for youth than elder, ∂ψa/∂a < 0.
225.4 Returns to Schooling: Before and After Crisis
Finally, we shall now look into another aspect of crisis; impacts on senior workers. Our theory
also predicts that reservation quality of match is higher for senior than junior worker. Because
senior worker is also hard to ﬁnd an outside option with high price during the crisis, senior
workers stay in current matches. The testable hypothesis is that junior’s jobs are not more
stable than senior’s jobs even in the period of crisis.
Our empirical strategy is also straightforward because we know individual ages at shock.
Every worker can not adjust her age at shock in 1997. This randomization gives us reduced-
form approach to estimate the eﬀect of age at crisis on labour market outcome. The reduced
form eﬀect of age at crisis can be shown here by comparing the means of the outcomes in workers
who have nine age categories at the period before and after crisis. That is why, the key point of
the data collection is to identify a treatment group as years of schooling m at the period after
crisis and a control group as years of schooling m at the period after crisis. We deﬁne Smit as a
dummy variable equals to 1 if the individual i’s age at year t is included in education categories
m. We also use Dit as a dummy variable equals to 1 if individual i is recorded in the data at
the period after crisis. We make interaction variable of “years of schooling at crisis” Smit ∗ Dit
now. Eit as an employment dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual i is wages worker at
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We can also run the following regression to test empirical hypothesis that reallocation occurs
especially for senior worker at the period after crisis:
Eit = Xitβ +
 
m
(Smit ∗ Dit)µm + vit, (12)
where vit as the composite of unobserved individual productivity and/or quality of job match.
The coeﬃcient µm captures the impacts of individual’s years of schooling at crisis on employment
probability relative to same years of schooling at the period before crisis. Because of negative
shock on the labour market, we expect that µm < 0 and ∂µm/∂m > 0. The former µm < 0
means that it is diﬃcult to be employed at the period after crisis for individual who has years
of schooling m relative to the period before crisis for individual who has same years of schooling
23m. The latter means that the negative impacts of age at shock are decreasing with years of
schooling.
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i at year 1994, 1995, 1996 as control group.
The following wages regression is also to test our empirical hypothesis that wage premium of
years of schooling at shock is positive due to tight selection into the labour market:
logWit = Xitβ +
 
m
(Smit ∗ Dit)ζm + uit, (13)
where the coeﬃcient ζ captures the impacts of years of schooling at shock on wages for treatment
group as employment at the period after crisis relative to control group as employment at the
period before crisis. We expect ζm is signiﬁcantly positive and it is higher for more educated,
∂ζm/∂m > 0.
6 Results
6.1 Selection Tightens for Newly Entrants after Crisis
Thanks to the randomization, we can identify newly entrants at the period after crisis D1it =1
as treatment group and the newly entrants at the period before crisis D1it = 0 as control
group. That is why, our estimation, testing, and empirical results are also straightforward to
understand.
First, we test entry-selection hypothesis to check the marginal eﬀects on D1it dummy in
probability model of employment and to check the estimates of D1it dummy in wages equation.
Entry-selection hypothesis tells us that market selection for newly entrants is tight at the period
after crisis. This means that the realized average productivity and/or quality of match for newly
entrants may be higher than the newly entrants at the period before crisis. Table 8 provides
support for entry-selection hypothesis: the marginal eﬀect in row 1 (D1i1998) shows that newly
entrants at the period after crisis have approximately 10.5% smaller probability of employment
24than newly entrants at the period before crisis with the same 1 year of potential labour market
experience. This means that the probability of employment is 10.5% lower when timing of newly
entrants moves from the period before crisis (D1i1998 = 0) to the period after crisis (D1i1998 = 1).
Row 2 of D1i1998 also shows the marginal eﬀect for white-collar subsample: newly entrants at
the period after crisis also experience approximately 9.6% smaller probability of employment
than newly entrants at the period before crisis with the same 1 year of potential labour market
experience. Row 3 of D1i1998 also presents the marginal eﬀect for blue-collar subsample: newly
entrants at the period after crisis also experience approximately 6.5% smaller probability of
employment than newly entrants at the period before crisis with the same 1 year of potential
labour market experience. These results mean that it is diﬃcult for newly entrants at the
period after crisis to be wages worker (or to ﬁnd a good ﬁrm). The possibilities are negative
price shock due to the negative demand shift in the face of crisis. The negative price shock
will be compensated for the high quality of match. Newly entrants do not seem to ﬁnd a good
partner with high price or high quality of match. Especially, it is diﬃcult for newly entrants at
the period after crisis to be white-collar.
Secondly, row 1 of D1i1999 reveals that newly entrants at the period after crisis have approx-
imately 3.3% smaller probability of employment than newly entrants at the period before crisis
with the same 1 year of potential labour market experience. But this is insigniﬁcant. Row 2 of
D1i1999 also shows the marginal eﬀect for white-collar subsample: newly entrants at the period
after crisis also experience approximately 7.9% smaller probability of employment than newly
entrants at the period before crisis with the same 1 year of potential labour market experience.
It is also diﬃcult to be white-collar worker for newly entrants at year 1999. But there is quite
diﬀerent situation for blue-collar workers. Row 3 of D1i1999 presents the marginal eﬀect for
blue-collar subsample: newly entrants at the period after crisis also experience approximately
zero percent smaller probability of employment than newly entrants at the period before crisis
with the same 1 year of potential labour market experience. Newly blue-collar entrants do not
face of crisis at year 1999.
Finally, row 1 of D1i2000 means that newly entrants at the period after crisis have approxi-
mately 11.3% smaller probability of employment than newly entrants at the period before crisis
with the same 1 year of potential labour market experience. But this is insigniﬁcant. Row 2
of D1i2000 appears the marginal eﬀect for white-collar subsample: newly entrants at the period
after crisis also experience approximately 7.1% smaller probability of employment than newly
25entrants at the period before crisis with the same 1 year of potential labour market experience.
There is also similar situation for blue-collar workers. Row 3 of D1i1999 reveals the marginal
eﬀect for blue-collar subsample: newly entrants at the period after crisis also experience ap-
proximately 7.3 % smaller probability of employment than newly entrants at the period before
crisis with the same 1 year of potential labour market experience. It is quite diﬃcult to be wage
employed for both of white and blue-collar subsample.
Highly interesting point in the result is the eﬀect of years of schooling on employment prob-
ability. This is not signiﬁcant for white collar and blue collar subsample with 1 year of potential
labour market experience. We will back to this point at stage of wages regression.
Insert table 8 here.
On wages regression, table 9 does not provide support for an aspect of entry-selection hy-
pothesis: the estimates for the whole sample, white-collar subsample, and blue collar-subsample
(row1 of D1i1998,r o w 2o fD1i1998, and row3 of D1i1998): newly entrants at the period after crisis
have approximately zero percent larger wages level than newly entrants at the period after crisis
with 1 year of potential labour market experience.
Row 1 of D1i1999 shows that newly entrants at the period after crisis experience approximately
12% smaller wages level than newly entrants at the period after crisis with 1 year of potential
labour market experience. The estimate for white-collar subsample in row 2 reveals that newly
entrants at the period after crisis experience approximately 6.4% smaller wages level than newly
entrants at the period after crisis with 1 year of potential labour market experience. The estimate
of row 3 shows that newly entrants also experience 16% smaller wages level than newly entrants
in blue-collar worker at the period before crisis.
For whole sample, row 1 of D1i2000 captures that newly entrants at the period after crisis
experience approximately 14.9% smaller wages level than newly entrants at the period after crisis
with 1 year of potential labour market experience. The estimate for white-collar subsample in
row 2 of D1i2000 shows that newly entrants at the period after crisis experience approximately
9.1% smaller wages level than newly entrants at the period after crisis with 1 year of potential
labour market experience. The estimate of row 3 of D1i2000 also shows that newly entrants also
26experience 17.2% smaller wages level than newly entrants in blue-collar worker at the period
before crisis.
In short, we can not support fully the entry-selection hypothesis in the face of crisis to test
the marginal eﬀects on dummy variable in employment probability model and the estimates
of coeﬃcient of dummy variable in wages equation respectively. The eﬀect of schooling on
employment equation and wages equation are not signiﬁcant for white and blue collar subsample
with 1 year of potential labour market experience. We compare these results with the results
from subsample with 2 year and 3 year of potential labour market experiences at next stage.
Insert table 9 here.
6.2 Rain or Drizzle then Cloudy for Newly Entrants?
We check the marginal eﬀect of employment probability for individuals who have 2 years of
potential labour market experience and 3 years of potential labour market experience.
Table 10 suggests that we can not observe persistency gap between newly entrants at the
period before and after crisis with 2 years of potential labour market experience. The marginal
eﬀect in row 1 of B2i1998 shows that newly entrants with 2 years of experience at year 1998
have approximately 6.7% smaller probability of employment than newly entrants with 2 years of
experience at the period before crisis. The marginal eﬀect in row 3 of B2i1998 shows that newly
entrants in blue-collar occupation with 2 years of experience at year 1998 have approximately
6.2% smaller probability of employment than newly entrants with 2 years of experience at the
period before crisis. There is no disadvantage for newly entrants at the period after crisis until
they have 2 years of potential labour market experience. Row 2 of D2i1999 and row 3 of D2i1999
also show the marginal eﬀect for white-collar subsample: newly entrants at the period after
crisis with 2 years of potential labour market experience also do not have smaller probability of
employment than newly entrants at the period before crisis with the same 2 year of potential
labour market experience. There is no disadvantage for newly entrants in white collar market
at the period after crisis at year 1999. The marginal eﬀect in row 2 of D2i2000 means that newly
entrants in white-collar occupation with 2 years of experience at year 2000 have approximately
276.1% smaller probability of employment than newly entrants with 2 years of experience at the
period before crisis.
These results in table 10 mean that there is no diﬀerence of employment probability between
newly entrants at the period before and after crisis with same 2 years of potential labour market
experience. The years of schooling has insigniﬁcant eﬀect on employment for whole, white, blue
collar subsample with 2 years of potential labour market experience.
Insert table 10 here.
Table 11 also shows the result of wages equation for subsample with 2 years of potential
labour market experience: the estimates for the whole sample, row 1 of B2i1998 has approximately
13% smaller wages level than newly entrants at the period after crisis with 2 year of potential
labour market experience. Row 2 of B2i1998 (white-collar subsample) has approximately 10%
smaller wages level than newly entrants at the period after crisis with 2 year of potential labour
market experience. Row 3 of B2i1998 (blue-collar subsample) has approximately 14.8% smaller
wages level than newly entrants at the period after crisis with 2 year of potential labour market
experience.
Newly entrants at the period after crisis (D2i1999) have approximately 13.7% smaller wages
level than newly entrants at the period after crisis with 2 year of potential labour market
experience. But the estimate for white-collar subsample in row 2 of D2i1999 reveals that newly
entrants at the period after crisis experience approximately 8.2% smaller wages level than newly
entrants at the period after crisis with 2 years of potential labour market experience. The
estimate of row 3 of D2i1999 shows that newly entrants also experience 18.3% smaller wages level
than newly entrants in blue-collar worker at the period before crisis.
Newly entrants at the period after crisis (D2i2000) also have approximately 23.6% smaller
wages level than newly entrants at the period after crisis with 2 year of potential labour market
experience. The estimate for white-collar subsample in row 2 of D2i2000 shows that newly
entrants at the period after crisis experience approximately 15.6% smaller wages level than
newly entrants at the period after crisis with 2 years of potential labour market experience.
The estimate of row 3 of D2i2000 also shows that newly entrants also experience 24.2% smaller
28wages level than newly entrants in blue-collar worker at the period before crisis. The eﬀect of
schooling on employment equation was insigniﬁcant but the eﬀect of schooling on wages level is
signiﬁcant here.
Insert table 11 here.
Table 12 also reveals that we can not observe any gap between newly entrants at the period
before and after crisis with 3 years of potential labour market experience for white collar and
blue collar subsample except for blue collar workers who entry the market at year 2000 (D3i2000).
The marginal eﬀect in row 3 of D3i1998 (blue-collar subsample) shows that newly entrants with
3 years of experience at the period after crisis have approximately 2% smaller probability of
employment than newly entrants with 3 years of experience at the period before crisis. There
is some disadvantage for newly entrants in blue-collar occupation at the period after crisis until
they have 3 years of potential labour market experience.
These results in table 12 show that there is no diﬀerence of employment probability between
newly entrants at the period before and after crisis with same 3 years of potential labour market
experience for white collar and blue collar. The years of schooling has also insigniﬁcant eﬀect
on employment for all subsample with 3 years of potential labour market experience.
Insert table 12 here.
Finally, table 13 also presents the result of wages equation for subsample with 3 years of
potential labour market experience: the estimates for the whole sample, newly entrants at the
period after crisis D3i2000 have approximately 16% signiﬁcantly smaller wages level than newly
entrants at the period after crisis with 3 years of potential labour market experience. This is
signiﬁcant because employment selection become tight when newly entrants at the period after
crisis have 3 years of potential labour market experience relative to newly entrants at the period
before crisis. The estimate for white-collar subsample in row 2 of D3i2000 means that newly
entrants at the period after crisis have approximately 25.9% insigniﬁcantly smaller wages level
than newly entrants at the period after crisis with 3 years of potential labour market experience.
29The estimate of row 3 of D3i2000 shows that newly entrants also experience 8.8% signiﬁcantly
smaller wages level than newly entrants in blue-collar worker at the period before crisis.
The eﬀect of schooling on employment equation is also insigniﬁcant at this stage. But the
eﬀect of schooling on wages equation is highly signiﬁcant for all subsample with 3 years of
potential labour market experience.
Insert table 13 here.
It follows from what has been shown that we can not observe persistent diﬀerence of em-
ployment probability between treatment and control group overtime. The gap of probability of
employment for newly entrants at year 1998 would decrease from -10.5% at entry level to zero
% at 2 or 3 years later after the shock. On the other hand, wages level is decreasing over time.
6.3 No Evidences of Job and Wages Instability for Main Age Groups
Now we must draw attention to our data coverage to deal with selection by age at the shock.
Each age group is categorized by every 5 years of old from 13 years old to 59 years of old. Table
14 provides the results of the marginal eﬀect on each age at shock dummies in probability model
of employment. Row 1 in table 14 shows the result of whole sample. Junior or young workers
experience approximately 5.7% signiﬁcantly smaller probability of employment for 13 to 17 years
of old at shock than group of 13 to 17 years of old at the period before shock. The same is true
for 18 to 22 years of old at shock, for 23 to 27 years of old at shock, for 28 to 32 years of old at
shock in whole sample. This is also true for white a blue collar subsample. On the other hand,
main groups experience approximately 0.9% larger probability of employment for 33 to 37 years
of old at shock. This is true for 38 to 42 years of old at shock and for 43 to 47 years of old at
shock. The elder groups experience 1.1% smaller probability of employment for 48 to 52 years
of old at shock than group of 48 to 52 years of old at the period before shock. For over 53 years
of old at shock experience 4.1% smaller probability of employment.
The probability of job secured is unstable for white collar subsample. For 33 to 37 years of
old at shock have 2.5% smaller probability of employment and for 38 to 42 years of old at shock
30have 1.2% smaller probability of employment. Blue collar subsample experiences similar results
of whole sample.
Insert table 14 here.
Finally, we present the results of age premium in wages regression. The estimates for the
whole sample presented in table 15 does not show some support for an aspect of reallocation
hypothesis. The estimate in row 1 in table 15 reveals that senior workers have approximately
8.5% smaller wages level for 33 to 37 years of old, 3.9% smaller wages level for 38 to 42 years
of old, 3.9% smaller wages level for 43 to 47 years of old, 4.1% smaller wages level for 48 to 52
years of old at shock than wage employed at the period before crisis. This is true for white and
blue collar subsample. Junior workers experience negative wage shock at the period after crisis.
Insert table 15 here.
In brief, we can support the selection hypothesis especially for youth. Senior workers keep
job opportunities even in the crisis. Senior workers do not face on the more wage reduction than
junior workers at the period after crisis.
6.4 Returns to Schooling Change at the Period After Crisis
We shall discuss the returns to schooling in detail. We argue selection by schooling level at
the shock. Each level of schooling is categorized by every 2 years or 3 years of schooling from
2 years of schooling level to 18 years of schooling level. We have eight categories now. Table
16 shows the results of the marginal eﬀect on each years of schooling at shock dummies in
probability model of employment equation. The estimates of very lower education levels are
sharply declined at the period after crisis. For whole sample and blue-collar subsample, it is
diﬃcult for individuals with less than 8 years of schooling at the period after crisis to be wage
employed. For white-collar worker, it is quite diﬃcult for individuals with less than 13 years of
schooling (high school level) to be white-collar worker at the period after crisis. Shock aﬀects
especially for individuals with lower level of schooling.
31Insert table 16 here.
We show the results of returns to schooling in wages regression. We can understand that
returns to schooling changed in each category from the estimates for the whole sample presented
in table 17. The estimate in row 1 in table 17 shows the workers with less than 11 years of
schooling have 15% to 68% smaller wages level at the period after crisis than similar wage
employed at the period before crisis. The estimate in row 2 in table 17 also shows the workers
with less than 13 years of schooling have 30% to 90% smaller wages level at the period after
crisis than similar wage employed at the period before crisis.
Insert table 17 here.
It is clear that employment selection by schooling tightens for less schooling individuals.
Wage reductions occur especially for individuals with less schooling level.
7 Conclusion
We are now in a conclusion. This paper proposes three testable hypotheses to explain the impact
of crisis on labour market outcomes, returns to age, and returns to years of schooling. The ﬁrst
one is entry-selection hypothesis that employment selection tightens for newly entrants at period
after crisis with 1 year of potential labour market experience. This hypothesis predicts average
productivity or unobserved match quality is higher than newly entrants at the period before
crisis. The second one is persistent-gap hypothesis that the gap of employment probability and
wages level between newly entrants at the period before and after shock overtime. The last one
is selection for senior worker hypothesis that senior worker separates from current employer and
moves to another employer (job-to-job mobility) through large job destruction and job creation
at the period after crisis. If worker moves to another employer, then she will lost her employer
speciﬁc match quality (or ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital), this hypothesis predict the returns to
age is declining at the period after crisis.
In conclusion, (1) our empirical results partially support entry-selection hypothesis for newly
entrants at the period after crisis; (2) our empirical results do not support persistent-gap hy-
pothesis because the gap between treatment and control group tends to decrease overtime; (3)
32our empirical results do not support reallocation (or selection for senior worker) hypothesis be-
cause we can not observe no evidences of declining employment probability for main age labour
force. These results leave us one possibility; senior movers tend to same occupation and industry
or senior workers tend to stay in current employer without moving at the period after crisis.
Years of labour market experience have an important proxy of career speciﬁc match quality. If
she only moves within same career in her life, the years of labour market experience provides
information of career speciﬁc match quality. To focus on senior worker, we ﬁnd no evidences of
job and wages insecurities at the period after crisis.
The further extension which can be drawn from our theory and data is understanding the
behaviour towards the employment and wages risk. For example, studying workers’ search
intensity, unemployment duration, shifts in researvation wages, internal migration decision from
rural to urban/urban to rural, and intra-household allocation of labour supply during the crisis
are our future works.
33References
Alvarez, Fernando and Marcelo Veracierto, “Labor Market Policies in an Equilibrium
Search Model,” NBER Macroeconomic Annual, 1999.
Angrist, Joshua D. and Alan B. Krueger, “Instrumental Variables and the Search for
Identiﬁcation: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiment,” Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 2001, 15, 69–85.
, Guido W. Imbens, and Donald B. Rubin, “Identiﬁcation of Causal Eﬀects Using
Instrument,” Journal of American Economic Association, 1996, 91, 444–455.
Behrman, Jare R. and Pranee Tinakorn, “The Surprisingly Limited Impact of the Thai
Crisis on Labor Including on Many Allegedly More Vulnerable Workers,” Prepared for the
ICSEAD Research Contract by Thailand Development Research Institute, 2000.
, Anil B. Deolalikar, Pranee Tinakorn, and Worawan Chandoevwit, “The Eﬀects of
the Thai Economic Crisis and of Thai Labor Market Policies on Labor Market Outcomes,”
Prepared for the World Bank by Thailand Development Research Institute, 2000.
Bull, Clive and Boyan Jovanovic, “Mismatch Versus Derived-Demand Shift as Causes of
Labour Mobility,” Review of Economic Studies, 1988, 55, 169–175.
Crepon, Bruno and Francis Kramarz, “Employed 40 Hours or Not Employed 39: Lessons
from the 1982 Mandatory Reduction of the Workweek,” Journal of Political Economy, 2002,
110(6), 1355–1389.
Duﬂo, Esther, “Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indone-
sia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment,” American Economic Review, 2001, 91(4),
795–813.
Dustmann, Chirstian and Costas Meghir, “Wages, Experience, and Seniority,” Review of
Economic Studies, 2005, 72(1), 77–108.
Frankenberg, Elizabeth, James P. Smith, and Ducan Thomas, “Economic Shocks,
Wealth, and Welfare,” Journal of Human Resources, 2003, 38, 280–321.
Gibbons, Robert and Lawrence F. Katz, “Layoﬀs and Lemons,” Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics, 1991, 9, 351–380.
34and , “Does Unmeasured Ability Explain Inter-Industry Wage Diﬀerentials?,” Review of
Economic Studies, 1992, 59, 515–535.
Ham, John C. and Robert J. LaLonde, “The Eﬀect of Sample Selection and Initial Con-
ditions in Duration Models: Evidence from Experimental Data on Training,” Econometrica,
1996, 64(1), 175–205.
Heckman, James J., Hidehiko Ichimura, Jeﬀrey Smith, and Petra Todd, “Character-
izing Selection Bias Using Experimental Data,” Econometrica, 1998, 66(5), 1017–1098.
Jacobson, Louis S., Robert J LaLonde, and Daniel G. Sullivan, “Earnings Losses of
Displaced Workers,” American Economic Review, 1993, 83(4), 685–709.
Kimura, Yuichi, “The Role of Big Cities in Human Capital Accumulation: Evidences from
Thailand,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Kyoto University, 2004.
Kriechel, Ben, “Heterogeneity among Displaced Workers,” Ph.D. Dissertation of Universiteit
Maastricht, 2003.
Krueger, Alan B. and Lawrence H. Summers, “Eﬃciency Wages and the Inter-Industry
Wage Structure,” Econometrica, 1988, 56(2), 259–293.
Lucas, Robert E. and Edward C. Prescott, “Equilibrium Search and Unemployment,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 1974, 7, 188–209.
Machikita, Tomohiro, “Is Learning by Migrating in Megalopolis Really Important?,” CAEA
Discussion Paper, Kyoto University, 2004.
, “Formation of Search Markets and Networks in a Developing Economy: Evidences from
the Eﬀects of Heterogeneity and State Dependence on Job Search Method in Thailand,”
Mimeograph, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, 2005.
McKenzie, David J., “Aggregate Shocks and Urban Labor Market Responses: Evidence from
Argentina’s Financial Crisis,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2004, 52, 719–
758.
Neal, Derek, “Industry-Speciﬁc Human Capital: Evidence from Displaced Workers,” Journal
of Labor Economics, 1995, 13(4), 653–677.
35Parent, Daniel, “Industry-Speciﬁc Capital and the Wage Proﬁle: Evidence from the National
Londitudinal Survey of Youth and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,” Journal of Labor
Economics, 2000, 18(2), 306–323.
Rogerson, Richard, “Sectoral shocks, Human capital, and Displaced workers,” Review of
Economic Dynamics, 2005, 8(1), 89–105.
Rosenzweig, Mark R. and Kenneth I. Wolpin, “Natural “Natural Experiments” in Eco-
nomics,” Journal of Economic Literature, 2000, 38, 827–874.
Smith, James P., Duncan Thomas, Elizabeth Frankenberg, Kathleen Beegle, and
Gracierla Teruel, “Wages, Employment, and Economic Shocks: Evidence from Indonesia,”
Journal of Population Economics, 2002, 15, 161–193.
Thomas, Duncan, Kathleen Beegle, Elizabeth Frankenberg, Bondan Sikoki, John
Strauss, and Graciela Teruel, “Education in a Crisis,” Journal of Development Economics,
2004, 74, 53–85.
Wright, Randall, “Job Search and Cyclical Unemployment,” Journal of Political Economy,
1986, 94(1), 38–55.
Yamauchi, Futoshi, “Is Education More Robust Than Labor-Market Experience in the Face
of Crisis,” Mimeograph, IFPRI, 2002.
36Table 1: Wages equation at the period before and after crisis
Variable Before Crisis After Crisis
Age .050 .044
(.003) (.002)
Age squared -.0003 -.0002
(.000) (.000)








Adjusted R2. 0.559 0.570
Obs. 80511 74768
Note. Dependent variable is log of weekly wages. Explanatory variables which are excluded in this table are
industry dummy variables. Ages are restricted from 13 years old to 59 years of old. GBA dummy means Greater
Bangkok Area dummy is equal to 1 if individual are living in Bangkok metropolitan area. Standard deviations
are in parentheses. All explanatory variables are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 99% conﬁdence. Source:
Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
37Table 2: Descriptive Statistics





Household size 4.371 4.240
(3.097) (3.066)




Wage employed .392 .396
(.488) (.489)
Log of weekly wage 7.191 7.179
(.747) (.740)
Log of proﬁt for self-employed 7.380 7.239
(.930) (.855)
Log of proﬁt for farmer 6.083 6.145
(1.038) (.964)
Number of working days 6.278 6.142
(1.037) (1.130)
Number of not working days .160 .211
(.658) (.773)




Union member .027 .096
(.163) (.297)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The age is restricted from 13 years of old to 59 years of old. Source:
Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1998-2000.
38Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (Industry)
Variable Before crisis After crisis
Agriculture, forestry, hunting, and ﬁshing .359 .348
(.480) (.476)
Mining and quarrying .002 .001
(.042) (.038)
Light manufacturing .073 .072
(.260) (.258)
Heavy manufacturing .062 .065
(.241) (.246)
Construction, repair, and demolition .055 .041
(.227) (.198)










Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The age is restricted from 13 years of old to 59 years of old. Source:
Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1998-2000.
39Table 4: Descriptive Statistics (Occupation)
Variable Before crisis After crisis
Professional and technical workers .082 .093
(.274) (.291)
Administrative, executive, and managerial workers .036 .040
(.187) (.197)
Clerical workers .050 .045
(.218) (.207)
Sales workers .179 .190
(.383) (.393)
Farmers and ﬁsherman .360 .349
(.480) (.477)
Miners and quarryman .0004 .0005
(.020) (.022)




Machine operators .063 .067
(.244) (.249)
Service workers .070 .071
(.258) (.256)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Ages are restricted from 13 years of old to 59 years of old. Source:
Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1998-2000.
40Table 5: Years of schooling for wage employed at the period before and after crisis
Variable Before crisis After crisis
Schooling 8.626 9.274
(4.978) (5.043)
Schooling of white-collar 13.249 13.682
(3.963) (3.780)
Schooling of blue-collar 6.6301 7.276
(3.936) (4.205)
Schooling of GBA worker 9.562 10.177
(5.038) (5.045)
Schooling of rural area worker 8.511 9.170
(4.959) (5.032)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Ages are restricted from 13 years of old to 59 years of old. Sample
is restricted by wage employed. Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1998-2000.
Table 6: Wages for employed workers at the period before and after crisis
Variable Before crisis After crisis
Log(wages) 7.327 7.328
(.745) (.733)
Log(White-collar wages) 7.815 7.777
(.618) (.629)
Log(Blue-collar wages) 6.945 6.932
(.598) (.572)
Log(GBA dwages) 7.550 7.541
(.693) (.695)
Log(Rural area wages) 7.294 7.298
(.746) (.733)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Ages are restricted from 13 years of old to 59 years of old. Sample
is restricted by wage employed. Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1998-2000.
41Table 7: Years of Entry and Length of Experience: Treatment and Control Group
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1 C1 C1 C1 C1 T2 T2 T2
2 C1 C1 C1 T1 T2 T2
3 C1 C1 T1 T1 T2
4 C1 T1 T1 T1
5 T1 T1 T1
6 T1 T1
7 T1
Note: Each column means years of entry. Each row shows years of potential labour market experiences are
calculated by her age minuses her years of schooling completion at survey years. Financial crisis comes to the
market at summer and fall in 1997. Each T1 means means the group of newly entrants at the period before crisis
but working at the period after crisis (treatment group 1). Each T2 means the group of newly entrants at the
period after crisis (treatment group 2). On the other hand, each C1 means the group of newly entrants at the
period before crisis (control group).
42Table 8: Marginal eﬀects on shock dummy in employment equation at entry level
Sample Whole White Blue
D1i1998 (T2) −.105∗∗∗ −.096∗∗∗ −.065∗∗∗
(.026) (.042) (.025)
D1i1999 (T2) −.033 −.079∗∗∗ −.001
(.027) (.032) (.029)
D1i2000 (T2) −.113∗∗∗ −.071∗∗ −.073∗∗
(.028) (.039) (.028)
Age −.024 .127∗∗ −.035
(.037) (.058) (.040)
Age squared .001∗∗ −.002∗ .001∗
(.001) (.001) (.001)
Male −.105∗∗∗ −.019 −.052∗∗∗
(.019) (.023) (.020)
Years of Schooling .038∗ −.029 .036
(.021) (.019) (.023)
GBA .295∗∗∗ −.007 .351∗∗∗
(.028) (.020) (.039)
Adjusted R2 0.255 0.040 0.153
Obs. 8943 2601 6342
Note. Dependent variable is wage employment dummy is equal to 1 if individual i is a wage worker. This is
equal to zero if individual i is unemployment, self-employment, farmer, and working in agricultural sector. D1it
dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual labour market experience is less than 1 year at year t=1998, 1999,
and 2000. D1it dummy variable equal to zero if the individual labour market experience is less than 1 year at
year t=1994, 1995, and 1996. We restrict all sample is in their entry level. That is, treatment group is newly
entrants at the period after crisis who have less than 1 year of potential experience of labour market in year 1998.
Control group covers newly entrants who are less than 1 year of potential labour market experience at the period
before ﬁnancial crisis. GBA means Greater Bangkok Area dummy variable. Industry dummy variables are not
included in explanatory variable. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Source: Thailand Labor Force
Survey, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
∗∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 99 % conﬁdence.
∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 95 % conﬁdence.
∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 90 % conﬁdence.
43Table 9: Coeﬃcients on shock dummy in wages equation at entry level
Sample Whole White Blue
D1i1998 (T2) −.052 −.064 −.000
(.037) (.040) (.062)
D1i1999 (T2) −.128∗∗∗ −.064∗ −.159∗∗∗
(.028) (.036) (.042)
D1i2000 (T2) −.149∗∗∗ −.091∗∗ −.172∗∗∗
(.029) (.039) (.043)
Age squared −.004∗∗∗ −.008∗∗∗ −.002
(.001) (.003) (.001)
Male .030 .099∗∗∗ .053
(.024) (.034) (.039)
Years of Schooling .047∗∗ .031 .037
(.023) (.029) (.035)
GBA .322∗∗∗ .312∗∗∗ .280∗∗∗
(.028) (.032) (.044)
Intercept 3.153∗∗∗ 2.233∗ 3.976∗∗∗
(.574) (1.176) (.707)
Industry dummy yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.513 0.334 0.491
Obs. 3935 2274 1661
Note. Dependent variable is log of weekly wage. This is equal to zero if individual i is unemployment, self-
employment, farmer, and working in agricultural sector. D1it dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual labour
market experience is less than 1 year at year t=1998, 1999, and 2000. D1it dummy variable equal to zero if the
individual labour market experience is less than 1 year at year t=1994, 1995, and 1996. We restrict all sample is in
their entry level. That is, treatment group is newly entrants at the period after crisis who have less than 1 year of
potential experience of labour market in year 1998. Control group covers newly entrants who are less than 1 year
of potential labour market experience at the period before ﬁnancial crisis. GBA means Greater Bangkok Area
dummy variable. Industry dummy variables are not included in explanatory variable. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors. Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
∗∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 99 % conﬁdence.
∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 95 % conﬁdence.
∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 90 % conﬁdence.
44Table 10: Marginal eﬀects on shock dummy in employment equation with the 2 years after shock
Sample Whole White Blue
D2i1998 (T1) −.067∗∗ .006 −.062∗∗
(.029) (.033) (.026)
D2i1999 (T2) .003 .034 −.001
(.030) (.027) (.029)
D2i2000 (T2) −.032 .061∗∗∗ −.033
(.028) (.023) (.027)
Age squared .001 −.001 .001
(.001) (.001) (.001)
Male −.118∗∗∗ .007 −.086∗∗∗
(.021) (.027) (.020)
Years of Schooling .010 .041 .015
(.038) (.062) (.029)
GBA .317∗∗∗ −.013 .377∗∗∗
(.037) (.028) (.040)
R2 0.23 0.024 0.126
Obs. 7718 1897 5821
Note. Dependent variable is wage employment dummy is equal to 1 if individual i is a wage worker. This is equal
to zero if individual i is unemployment, self-employment, farmer, and working in agricultural sector. D2i1998
dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual labour market experience is 2 year at year 1998. D2it dummy variable
equal to 1 if the individual labour market experience is less than 2 year at year t=1999 and 2000. D2it dummy
variable equal to zero if the individual labour market experience is less than 2 year at year t=1994, 1995, and
1996. That is, treatment group is newly entrants at the period after crisis who have 2 years of potential experience
of labour market in year 1999. Control group covers newly entrants who have 2 years of potential labour market
experience at the period before ﬁnancial crisis. GBA means Greater Bangkok Area dummy variable. Industry
dummy variables are not included in explanatory variable. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Source:
Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
∗∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 99 % conﬁdence.
∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 95 % conﬁdence.
∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 90 % conﬁdence.
45Table 11: Coeﬃcients on shock dummy in wages equation with the 2 years after shock
Sample Whole White Blue
D2i1998 (T1) −.130∗∗∗ −.100∗∗∗ −.148∗∗∗
(.037) (.047) (.054)
D2i1999 (T2) −.137∗∗∗ −.082∗∗ −.183∗∗∗
(.032) (.042) (.044)
D2i2000 (T2) −.236∗∗∗ −.156∗∗∗ −.242∗∗∗
(.036) (.048) (.049)
Age squared −.003∗∗∗ −.006∗∗∗ −.003∗∗
(.001) (.002) (.001)
Male .044∗ .063 .092∗∗∗
(.026) (.039) (.035)
Years of Schooling .251∗∗∗ .362∗∗∗ .209∗∗∗
(.041) (.098) (.0485)
GBA .320∗∗∗ .368∗∗∗ .278∗∗∗
(.028) (.037) (.037)
Intercept 5.195∗∗∗ 5.096∗∗∗ 5.632∗∗∗
(.289) (.334) (.128)
Industry dummy yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.578 0.386 0.549
Obs. 3184 1647 1537
Note. Dependent variable is log of weekly wage. This is equal to zero if individual i is unemployment, self-
employment, farmer, and working in agricultural sector. D2i1998 dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual
labour market experience is 2 year at year 1998. D2it dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual labour market
experience is less than 2 year at year t=1999 and 2000. D2it dummy variable equal to zero if the individual
labour market experience is less than 2 year at year t=1994, 1995, and 1996. That is, treatment group is newly
entrants at the period after crisis who have 2 years of potential experience of labour market in year 1999. Control
group covers newly entrants who have 2 years of potential labour market experience at the period before ﬁnancial
crisis. GBA means Greater Bangkok Area dummy variable. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Source:
Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
∗∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 99 % conﬁdence.
∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 95 % conﬁdence.
∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 90 % conﬁdence.
46Table 12: Marginal eﬀects on shock dummy in employment equation with the 3 years after shock
Sample Whole White Blue
D3i1998 (T1) −.047∗ −.014 −.029
(.0249) (.0283) (.024)
D3i1999 (T1) −.020 .010 .000
(.026) (.026) (.026)
D3i2000 (T2) −.044 −.019 −.019∗∗∗
(.027) (.026) (.027)
Age squared .001 .000 .000
(.001) (.001) (.001)
Male −.060∗∗∗ .010 −.031
(.019) (.019) (.019)
Years of Schooling .031 −.001 .038
(.031) (.047) (.032)
GBA .304∗∗∗ −.011 .347∗∗∗
(.030) (.020) (.037)
Adjusted R2 0.195 0.01 0.104
Obs. 8935 2153 6782
Note. Dependent variable is wage employment dummy is equal to 1 if she is a wage worker. This is equal to
zero if individual i is unemployment, self-employment, farmer, and working in agricultural sector. D3it dummy
variable equal to 1 if the individual labour market experience is 3 years at year t= 1998 and 1999. D3i1998 and
D3i1999 are newly entrants at the period before crisis but working at the period after crisis. D3i2000 dummy
variable equal to 1 if the individual labour market experience is 3 years at year 2000. That is, treatment group
is newly entrants at the period after crisis who 3 years of potential experience of labour market in year 2000.
Control group covers newly entrants who have 3 years of potential labour market experience at the period before
ﬁnancial crisis. GBA means Greater Bangkok Area dummy variable. Industry dummy variables are not included
in explanatory variable. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey,
1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
∗∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 99 % conﬁdence.
∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 95 % conﬁdence.
∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 90 % conﬁdence.
47Table 13: Coeﬃcients on shock dummy in wages equation with the 3 years after shock
Sample Whole White Blue
D3i1998 (T1) −.120∗∗∗ −.197∗∗∗ −.046
(.034) (.041) (.049)
D3i1999 (T1) −.114∗∗∗ −.145∗∗∗ −.089∗∗
(.031) (.038) (.044)
D3i2000 (T2) −.160∗∗∗ −.259∗∗∗ −.088∗
(.038) (.058) (.050)
Age squared −.002∗ −.005∗∗ −.000
(.001) (.002) (.001)
Male −.006 .077∗ −.025
(.028) (.045) (.036)
Years of Schooling .177∗∗∗ .311∗∗∗ .115∗∗
(.038) (.091) (.049)
GBA .305∗∗∗ .331∗∗∗ .270∗∗∗
(.028) (.037) (.037)
Intercept 5.504∗∗∗ 5.353∗∗∗ 5.859∗∗∗
(.079) (.216) (.099)
Industry dummy yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.560 0.463 0.426
Obs. 3892 1863 2029
Note. Dependent variable is log of weekly wage. This is equal to zero if individual i is unemployment, self-
employment, farmer, and working in agricultural sector. D3it dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual labour
market experience is 3 years at year t= 1998 and 1999. D3i1998 and D3i1999 are newly entrants at the period before
crisis but working at the period after crisis. D3i2000 dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual labour market
experience is 3 years at year 2000. That is, treatment group is newly entrants at the period after crisis who 3
years of potential experience of labour market in year 2000. Control group covers newly entrants who have 3 years
of potential labour market experience at the period before ﬁnancial crisis. GBA means Greater Bangkok Area
dummy variable. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996
and 1998-2000.
∗∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 99 % conﬁdence.
∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 95 % conﬁdence.
∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 90 % conﬁdence.
48Table 14: Marginal eﬀects on age at shock dummy in employment equation
Sample Whole White Blue
13 to 17 years of old at Shock −.057∗∗∗ .034 −.039∗∗∗
(.009) (.020) (.008)
18 to 22 years of old at Shock −.046∗∗∗ −.012 −.020∗∗∗
(.006) (.0130) (.006)
23 to 27 years of old at Shock −.025∗∗∗ −.011 −.010∗∗
(.005) (.007) (.005)
28 to 32 years of old at Shock −.023∗∗∗ −.030∗∗∗ −.003
(.008) (.008) (.005)
33 to 37 years of old at Shock .009∗∗ −.025∗∗∗ .014∗∗∗
(.005) (.007) (.005)
38 to 42 years of old at Shock .027∗∗∗ −.012∗ .026∗∗∗
(.005) (.008) (.005)
43 to 47 years of old at Shock .019∗∗∗ −.001 .019∗∗∗
(.005) (.008) (.005)
48 to 52 years of old at Shock −.011∗∗ −.009 −.004
(.006) (.011) (.005)
53 years + of old at Shock −.041∗∗∗ −.001 −.028∗∗∗
(.006) (.012) (.006)
Industry dummy yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.163 0.045 0.088
Obs. 503677 85985 417692
Note. Dependent variable is wage employment dummy is equal to 1 if she is a wage worker. This is equal to
zero if individual i is unemployment, self-employment, farmer, and working in agricultural sector. Treatment
group is that Age at Shock is equal to 1 at the period after crisis. Control group is that Age at Shock is equal
to zero at the period before ﬁnancial crisis. Age is restricted from 13 years of old to 59 years of old during
the sample periods. GBA means Greater Bangkok Area dummy variable. Numbers in parentheses are standard
errors. Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
∗∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 99 % conﬁdence.
∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 95 % conﬁdence.
∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 90 % conﬁdence.
49Table 15: Coeﬃcients on age at shock dummy in wages equation
Sample Whole White Blue
13 to 17 years of old at Shock −.156∗∗∗ .005 −.229∗∗∗
(.021) (.080) (.022)
18 to 22 years of old at Shock −.129∗∗∗ −.082∗∗∗ −.120∗∗∗
(.010) (.020) (.012)
23 to 27 years of old at Shock −.149∗∗∗ −.147∗∗∗ −.069∗∗∗
(.008) (.013) (.009)
28 to 32 years of old at Shock −.116∗∗∗ −.111∗∗∗ −.049∗∗∗
(.008) (.012) (.010)
33 to 37 years of old at Shock −.086∗∗∗ −.109∗∗∗ −.037∗∗∗
(.009) (.014) (.010)
38 to 42 years of old at Shock −.039∗∗∗ −.034∗∗ −.036∗∗∗
(.011) (.016) (.014)
43 to 47 years of old at Shock −.039∗∗∗ −.032 −.070∗∗∗
(.013) (.017) (.017)
48 to 52 years of old at Shock −.041∗∗ −.019 −.122∗∗∗
(.017) (.021) (.022)
53 years + of old at Shock −.111∗∗∗ −.140∗∗∗ −.164∗∗∗
(.028) (.030) (.039)
Industry dummy yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.567 0.507 0.360
Obs. 152837 68698 84139
Note. Dependent variable is log of weekly wage is equal to 1 if individual i is a wage worker. This is equal to zero
if she is unemployment, self-employment, farmer, and working in agricultural sector. Treatment group is that
Age at Shock is equal to 1 at the period after crisis. Control group is that Age at Shock is equal to zero at the
period before ﬁnancial crisis. GBA means Greater Bangkok Area dummy variable. Numbers in parentheses are
standard errors. Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
∗∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 99 % conﬁdence.
∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 95 % conﬁdence.
∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 90 % conﬁdence.
50Table 16: Marginal eﬀects on years of schooling at shock dummy in employment equation
Sample Whole White Blue
2 to 3 years of schooling at Shock −.115∗∗∗ −.173∗∗∗ −.050∗∗∗
(.006) (.067) (.006)
4 to 5 years of schooling at Shock −.093∗∗∗ −.114∗∗∗ −.033∗∗∗
(.003) (.013) (.003)
6 to 8 years of schooling at Shock −.066∗∗∗ −.061∗∗∗ −.025∗∗∗
(.004) (.014) (.004)
9 to 11 years of schooling at Shock .105∗∗∗ −.062∗∗∗ .119∗∗∗
(.005) (.010) (.005)
12 to 13 years of schooling at Shock .230∗∗∗ −.037∗∗∗ .225∗∗∗
(.008) (.010) (.009)
14 to 15 years of schooling at Shock .439∗∗∗ .032∗∗∗ .291∗∗∗
(.007) (.005) (.012)
16 to 17 years of schooling at Shock .498∗∗∗ .021∗∗∗ .434∗∗∗
(.007) (.005) (.019)
18 + years of schooling at Shock .424∗∗∗ −.013 .372∗∗∗
(.010) (.009) (.016)
Industry dummy yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.123 0.032 0.076
Obs. 503991 86043 417948
Note. Dependent variable is wage employment dummy is equal to 1 if individual i is a wage worker. This is equal
to zero if individual i is unemployment, self-employment, farmer, and working in agricultural sector. Treatment
group is that Years of schooling at Shock is equal to 1 at the period after crisis. Control group is that Years of
schooling at Shock is equal to zero at the period before ﬁnancial crisis. Age is restricted from 13 years of old
to 59 years of old during the sample periods. GBA means Greater Bangkok Area dummy variable. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
∗∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 99 % conﬁdence.
∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 95 % conﬁdence.
∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 90 % conﬁdence.
51Table 17: Coeﬃcients on yeas of schooling at shock dummy in wages equation
Sample Whole White Blue
2 to 3 years of schooling at Shock −.684∗∗∗ −.928 −.351∗∗∗
(.023) (.126) (.020)
4 to 5 years of schooling at Shock −.542∗∗∗ −.992∗∗∗ −.195∗∗∗
(.010) (.040) (.010)
6 to 8 years of schooling at Shock −.278∗∗∗ −.558∗∗∗ −.106∗∗∗
(.009) (.0316) (.009)
9 to 11 years of schooling at Shock −.145∗∗∗ −.524∗∗∗ .070∗∗∗
(.010) (.022) (.011)
12 to 13 years of schooling at Shock −.007 −.316∗∗∗ .172∗∗∗
(.010) (.016) (.012)
14 to 15 years of schooling at Shock .357∗∗∗ −.012 .270∗∗∗
(.010) (.011) (.017)
16 to 17 years of schooling at Shock .632∗∗∗ .230∗∗∗ .650∗∗∗
(.011) (.011) (.0270)
18 + years of schooling at Shock .344∗∗∗ −.037∗∗ .432
(.013) (.015) (.024)
Industry dummy yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.424 0.442 0.290
Obs. 152911 68719 84192
Note. Dependent variable is log of weekly wage is equal to 1 if individual i is a wage worker. This is equal to zero
if she is unemployment, self-employment, farmer, and working in agricultural sector. Treatment group is that
Years of schooling at shock is equal to 1 at the period after crisis. Control group is that Years of schooling at
shock is equal to zero at the period before ﬁnancial crisis. GBA means Greater Bangkok Area dummy variable.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
∗∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 99 % conﬁdence.
∗∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 95 % conﬁdence.
∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 90 % conﬁdence.
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